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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal prosecution of child pornography offenders has increased
dramatically in recent years. In fact, "child pornography is one of the
fastest growing areas of prosecution by the Justice Department."' In
1996, just 156 defendants were convicted of child pornography related
offenses in federal court.2 As the Internet Age took hold in the decade
that followed, the number of convictions skyrocketed to 1150 in 2006 as
law enforcement officials ratcheted up efforts to patrol cyberspace and
apprehend those who pollute it with grotesque images of innocent chil-
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Miami School of Law; B.S., 2008, University of
Maryland. I would like to thank my amazing parents, John and Tina, and my brother, Jon, for
always supporting me. I would also like to thank Stacey for her love and encouragement and all
my friends for helping me through law school. Finally, I want to especially thank Erik Scharf for
his guidance on this paper and his mentorship during my time in law school.
1. United States v. Szymanski, No. 08-CR-417, 2009 WL 1212252, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr.
30, 2009).
2. MARK MOTIVANS & TRACEY KycKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIcs SPECIAL
REPORT: FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CRD SEx EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS 6 (2006), http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf.
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dren.' The same ten-year period saw astronomical increases in the sever-
ity of child pornography sentences. Between 1996 and 2006, the median
sentence imposed in child pornography cases jumped from fifteen
months to sixty-three months.' This radical increase was achieved
through mandatory sentences imposed by Congress and more severe
punishment recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guide-
lines.' But the current child pornography Guidelines have been widely
criticized for imposing illogically harsh punishments and disparate
sentences among similarly situated defendants.6
Numerous federal judges have recently joined the chorus of criti-
cism by condemning the Guidelines and refusing to give them the defer-
ence they typically command.' After the U.S. Supreme Court declared
3. Id. Child pornography prosecutions have increased an additional forty percent since 2006,
with 2315 suspects indicted under federal law in 2009 alone. Paul Elias, Child Porn Prosecutions
Soaring, S.F. CHRON., (Feb. 5, 2011, 11:05 PM), http://www.sfgate.comlcgi-bin/article.cgif=/nla/
2011/02/05/state/ni 10526S97.DTL#ixzz lDCIvERnn.
4. MoTivANs, supra note 2, at 6.
5. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
GUIDELINES (2009), http://www.ussc.gov/Research/ResearchProjects/SexOffenses/20091030
HistoryChild PornographyGuidelines.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) [hereinafter HISTORY]
(reporting the history of the child pornography Guidelines since their initial promulgation in
1987).
6. See Mark Hansen, A Reluctant Rebellion, A.B.A. J., June 2009, at 54. For an extensive
critique of the federal child pornography sentencing Guidelines, see Troy Stabenow,
Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A Primer on the Flawed Progression of the Child
Pornography Guidelines, http://www.fd.org/pdf_ lib/child%20pom%20july%20revision.pdf
(unpublished working paper, last updated Jan. 1, 2009). In this article, Federal Public Defender
Troy Stabenow effectively "deconstructs" the Guidelines and reveals serious flaws in how
defendants are being punished in child pornography cases. Defendants convicted of "receiving" or
"possessing" child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 are punished in accordance with
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2008). Section 2G2.2 establishes a base offense
levels for defendants convicted of "possessing" child pornography (18) and "receiving" child
pornography (22). Id. at § 2G2.2(a)(1), (2). "Receiving" child pornography carries a mandatory
five-year prison sentence, but "possession" has no mandatory minimum punishment. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(b) (2008). U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 provides for enhancements to the defendant's base offense
level if they exhibit certain offense characteristics. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2G2.2(b) (2008). Stabenow criticizes § 2G2.2 because the offense characteristics found in
subsection (b) apply in the majority of child pornography cases. Stabenow, supra at 26-27. As a
result, a mechanical application of § 2G2.2 often yields a guideline recommendation close to the
statutory maximum (twenty years) for typical first-time offenders who download images of child
pornography. Id.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104-05 (N.D. Iowa 2009); United States v. Riley, 655 F.
Supp. 2d 1298, 1300 (S.D. Fla. 2009); United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d 886, 895
(E.D. Tenn. 2009); United States v. Cruikshank, 667 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702 (S.D. W. Va. 2009);
United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 412 (D. N.J. 2008); United States v. Hanson, 561 F.
Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (E.D. Wis. 2008); United States v. Johnson, 588 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1004 (S.D.
Iowa 2008); United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 895 (D. Neb. 2008). But see United
States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844 (N.D. Ohio 2010), for a comprehensive defense of the
child pornography Guidelines and a rebuttal to the arguments put forth in Stebanow, supra note 6.
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the Guidelines advisory in United States v. Booker," federal judges
across the country began to frequently impose below-Guideline
sentences in child pornography cases.9 In 2007, 351 out of 1025 defend-
ants sentenced for nonproduction-related offenses received downward
departures from the recommended Guideline range.' 0 Today, over forty
percent of defendants convicted of federal child pornography offenses
receive sentences below the Guidelines." At least for nonproduction
related offenses, most judges feel that the Guidelines are too harsh. 12
Judge Gilbert Merritt of the Sixth Circuit complained that "[o]ur 'social
revolution' against these 'misfits' downloading these images is perhaps
somewhat more rational than the thousands of witchcraft trials and burn-
ings conducted in Europe and here from the Thirteenth to the Eighteenth
Centuries, but it borders on the same thing."13 But not everyone sees it
that way. Prosecutors and child advocacy groups believe that harsh pun-
ishment is necessary to protect children who are victimized during the
production of images and subsequently re-victimized every single time
the images are viewed.14 The proponents of strict sentencing also draw
links between child pornography and contact offenses, arguing that those
who possess and distribute images over the Internet are more likely to
sexually assault children in the future."
8. 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) ("[D]istrict courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines,
must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing."). Recent clarification
of Booker by the Supreme Court has emboldened district court judges to stray from the Guidelines
in child pornography cases. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007) ("[A]s a
general matter, courts may vary [from Guideline ranges] based solely on policy considerations,
including disagreements with the Guidelines.") (internal quotations omitted). See also Jamie
Satterfield, Porn Sentencing Rules Puzzle, KNoxNEWS.COM (Jan. 4, 2011, 9:51 PM), http://
www.knoxnews.com/news/201 1/jan/04/pom-sentencing-rules-puzzle/.
9. Hansen, supra note 6, at 56.
10. Id.
11. Amir Efrati, Judges Trim Jail Time for Child Porn, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2010, at A2.
12. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATEs DisTRiCT
JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 (June 2010), http://www.ussc.gov/Research/
ResearchProjects/Surveys/20100608_JudgeSurvey.pdf (reporting that seventy percent of district
court judges believe the Guidelines are inappropriate because they recommend sentences that are
too high). See also Felisa Cardona, Federal Judges Argue For Reduced Sentences For Child-Porn
Convicts, DENVER PosT, Nov. 29, 2009, at Al; Brian Bowling, Most Federal Judges Not
Comfortable With Tough Guidelines, Prrr. TRuB. REV. (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.pittsburghlive.
com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/s_711466.html.
13. United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 533 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
14. See generally Audrey Rodgers, Child Pornography's Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. R.
847, 853-54 (2008).
15. See Hansen, supra note 6, at 59. Interestingly, many judges justify below-guideline
sentences specifically because they are not convinced that there is any real link between child
pornography and contact offenses. See Efrati, supra note 10. Compare Carissa Byrne Hessick,
Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.con/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1577961 (arguing, inter
alia, that child sex abuse is improperly conflated with possession of child pornography), with
2011] 1029
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The goal of this Note is not to take sides in the heated debate over
how severe child pornography offenders should be punished. Instead,
this Note seeks to expose a serious problem with current federal child
pornography law that warrants correction. The problem stems from a
paradox found in 18 U.S.C. § 2252. In its current form, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252 imposes a mandatory five-year minimum sentence for defend-
ants convicted of "receiving" child pornography, but "possessing" child
pornography carries no mandatory minimum sentence.16 There is simply
no meaningful distinction between these two offenses or logical reason
to punish "receiving" child pornography more severely than "possess-
ing" it. Like all other types of contraband, it is by definition impossible
to "receive" child pornography without "possessing" it, at least at the
moment "receipt" occurs. Likewise, it is impossible to "possess" child
pornography without "receiving" it, except for the rare instance when
the possessor is the one who produced the pornography. So, as Judge
Posner recognized, "the puzzle is why receiving . . . should be punished
more severely than possessing, since possessors, unless they fabricate
their own pornography, are also receivers.""
This "puzzle" has significant ramifications for sentencing in the
vast majority of federal child pornography cases. Most child pomogra-
phy offenders are charged with "receiving" and/or "possessing" child
pornography under § 2252.1' Of these offenders, almost all use com-
puters to download and eventually store images." Therefore, the typical
child pornography downloader may be charged with "receipt," "posses-
sion," or both at the discretion of the prosecutor. This discretion fur-
nishes the prosecution with the power to determine the defendant's
ultimate sentencing fate simply because § 2252 punishes "receipt" more
severely than "possession." When a prosecutor elects to charge a defen-
dant with "receipt" instead of, or in conjunction with, "possession," he
or she strips the judicial branch of its authority to fashion an appropriate
sentence in light of the defendant's conduct.2 0 Federal prosecutors,
Julian Sher & Benedict Carey, Federal Study Stirs Debate on Child Pornography's Link to
Molesting, N.Y. TimEs, July 19, 2007, at A20 (discussing a study done by psychologists at the
Federal Bureau of Prisons that found that eighty-five percent of inmates convicted of possessing
or distributing child pornography had committed acts of sexual abuse against minors).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (2008).
17. United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.).
18. In 2007, only five percent of all child pornography defendants were charged with
production. Hansen, supra note 6, at 57.
19. In fiscal year 2006, ninety-seven percent of convicted child pornography offenders used a
computer. MovrANs & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 2, at 6.
20. United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998) ("A prosecutor can ...
manipulate the severity of a sentence by deciding whether to charge the defendant with receiving
or possessing child pornography-a result at apparent odds with the policy goals of the sentencing
guidelines.").
1030 [Vol. 65:1027
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aware of the recent judicial assault on the Guidelines, can always hedge
the risk that a judge will depart downward by charging defendants with
just "receipt." This effectively ties the judge's hands and ensures that the
defendant will serve five years in prison if convicted, regardless of what
he would have been sentenced to had he been convicted of "possession"
alone. Allowing prosecutors to exercise arbitrary discretion of this
nature subverts our constitutional structure and further exacerbates the
problems associated with child pornography sentencing.
Not surprisingly, defendants affected by § 2252's paradox have
looked to avoid the five-year mandatory minimum sentence that accom-
panies "receipt" convictions. The close nexus between "receipt" and
"possession" has subjected convictions under both provisions to scrutiny
under the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, which prohibits
multiple punishments imposed for the same offense. 2 1 This Note focuses
primarily on recent appellate court decisions examining whether the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits convictions based on "receiving" and
"possessing" child pornography. Those decisions are irreconcilable,
leaving the scope of double jeopardy protection in this context unclear.
This Note will analyze those decisions and flesh out their ramifications
on sentencing. It will demonstrate that the Double Jeopardy Clause can,
at times, protect child pornography offenders from the arbitrary differ-
ence in punishments for "receipt" and "possession" convictions. Ulti-
mately, however, a consistent approach to analyzing these double
jeopardy issues cannot remedy the adverse sentencing effects of
§ 2252's paradox. As a result, Congress must redraft § 2252 for clarity
and consistency so that simple "receipt" and "possession" of images
(usually accomplished by downloading) are prohibited by the same stat-
utory provision or punished equally by the Guidelines. Without congres-
sional action, § 2252 will continue to adversely affect the integrity of
child pornography sentencing.
Before analyzing the recent line of double jeopardy cases, it is nec-
essary to understand the history § 2252. Therefore, Part II gives a brief
historical overview of federal child pornography legislation, focusing
specifically on how "receipt" came to be punished more severely than
"possession." The beginning of Part III examines the Supreme Court
precedent used by the appellate courts to interpret the extent of double
jeopardy protection in this context. The remainder of Part III critiques
the line of cases interpreting the extent to which the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects defendants convicted of "receiving" and "possessing"
child pornography. In Part IV, I briefly conclude by urging Congress to
resolve § 2252's paradox.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2011]1 1031
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H. A BRIEF HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. § 2252
A. The Early Amendments to § 2252(a) (2)
In 1978, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 became law as part of the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.22 As enacted in 1978,
§ 2252 was much narrower in scope than it is today because Congress's
original intent was to thwart the widespread commercialization of child
pornography.23 The earliest version of § 2252 punished those transport-
ing, shipping, distributing, or receiving child pornography in interstate
or foreign commerce for the purpose of sale.24 However, it soon became
apparent that the original legislation was too limited in scope because
non-commercial trafficking of child pornography was also pervasive.2 5
To rectify this problem, Congress passed the Child Protection Act of
198426 which amended § 2252 and made non-commercial trafficking a
federal crime.27
The changes made by the 1984 amendments to § 2252 are critical
to understanding the ultimate confusion found in the statute today. The
original version of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) punished "[a]ny person who
... knowingly receive[d] for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale,
or knowingly s[old] or distribute[d] for sale, any" child pornography.28
To effectuate the intended change in § 2252's scope, Congress made
two simple changes to the language found in § 2252(a)(2). First, Con-
gress eliminated the requirement that "receiving" child pornography be
"for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale" from the statute alto-
gether.29 Congress also struck the language requiring "distribution" to be
"for sale."3 0 The resulting § 2252(a)(2) simply punishes "[a]ny person
who . . . knowingly receives, or distributes" child pornography."1
The amendments to § 2252(a)(2) gave federal law enforcement
officials more authority to frustrate the dissemination of child pornogra-
phy that was being exchanged, not just sold. Perhaps more significantly
however, the amendments created an entirely new class of offenders that
received and subsequently possessed child pornography for personal
22. Pub. L. No. 95-225, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 7, 7-8 (1978).
23. See United States v. Malik, 282 F. Supp. 2d 833, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2003) ("As initially
enacted in 1978, as part of the 'Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977,'
the conduct prohibited by Section 2252 expressly targeted the commercialization of child
pornography.").
24. § 2(a), 92 Stat. at 7-8 (1978).
25. H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 2-3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 493-94.
26. Pub. L. No. 98-292, § 4, 98 Stat. 204, 204 (1984).
27. H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 2-3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 493-94.
28. § 2(a), 92 Stat. at 7-8.
29. § 4(1), (2), 98 Stat. at 204.
30. Id.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2008).
1032 [Vol. 65:1027
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use, whether the images were bought or exchanged. The amended ver-
sion of § 2252(a)(2) does not require proof that the defendant intends to
distribute or profit from child pornography once it is received-it simply
requires proof that the defendant knowingly received contraband
images. The 1984 amendments to § 2252 did not directly criminalize
private possession of child pornography. However, private possession
was impossible to achieve without violating the amended version of
§ 2252(a)(2) because almost all possession stems from an instance of
receipt.3 2
The new class of personal-use receivers created by § 2252(a)(2)
would become the focus of federal law enforcement officials looking to
collapse the child pornography market by cutting end-user demand. In
1986, the federal government implemented "Operation Looking Glass,"
a program arising out of the National Child Pornography Reverse Sting
Project." "Under this program, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, in the
guise of a pornography dealer, corresponded with persons initially iden-
tified as predisposed towards child pornography and sent a child pornog-
raphy catalog and order form to those whose predisposition was
confirmed by subsequent test correspondence."3 4 If an individual
ordered child pornography from the catalogue, postal authorities would
execute a search warrant after the material was delivered." During the
late 1980s, undercover operations like "Operation Looking Glass"
resulted in numerous convictions under § 2252(a)(2).36
Some personal-use receivers challenged their convictions under the
new version of § 2252(a)(2), arguing that "the statute reache[d] only
receipt of [child pornography] for the purpose of redistribution rather
than personal use."" However, the courts of appeals rejected this limited
interpretation of § 2252(a)(2) as it was completely contrary to the plain
32. It is necessary to acknowledge that possessors are receivers in most, but not all instances.
For example, an individual could possess child pornography without receiving it if they produced
it. In that case, however, the individual would be subject to much harsher penalties for production.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.1(b)(3) (2008).




36. See, e.g., United States v. Kalinowski, 890 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Musslyn, 865 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Brown, 862 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1988);
United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Flippen, 861 F.2d 266
(4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Driscoll,
852 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1988).
37. United States v. Bevacqua, 864 F.2d 19, 20 (3d Cir. 1988). Because "receipt" is punished
as severely as "distribution" but more severely than "possession," the argument put forth in
Bevacqua has recently resurfaced. See, e.g., United States v. Olander, 572 F.3d 764 (9th Cir.
2009). The court in Olander found it "possible that the text of § 2252A(a)(2)(A), which penalizes
mere receipt of child pornography as severely as distribution and attempted distribution, is the
2011] 1033
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text of the statute and the purpose of the 1984 amendments. These
cases made it abundantly clear that it was illegal to receive child pornog-
raphy under § 2252(a)(2), even if the receiver intended only to possess
the material for personal use. 39 By criminalizing personal-use "receipt"
but not "possession," the amended version of § 2252(a)(2) fostered
inconsistent prosecution of similarly situated offenders. Reverse sting
operations like "Operation Looking Glass" were critical because they
were able to garner sufficient evidence of "receipt." But those caught
simply in "possession" of child pornography, with no evidence of
"receipt," could avoid a conviction under § 2252(a)(2) simply because
law enforcement intervened at a later time. This left a large class of
personal-use possessors outside the scope of § 2252, even though they
were just as culpable as the personal-use receivers punished under the
statute.
As detailed in Part II.B, Congress would eventually rectify this by
criminalizing "possession." However, that did not ultimately resolve the
problem of inconsistently punishing receivers and possessors. In fact, by
increasing § 2252's scope to include "possession," Congress inadver-
tently exacerbated that very problem by failing to reconcile the pro-
scribed punishments for both offenses.
B. Possession is Outlawed Under § 2252(a)(4)(B)
In 1990, Congress passed the Child Protection Restoration and Pen-
alties Enhancement Act,4 0 making it illegal to knowingly possess child
pornography under § 2252(a)(4)(B).4 1 Once "possession" was criminal-
ized, the Sentencing Commission was tasked with restructuring the
Guidelines in light of the 1990 amendments. 42 The Commission
responded by developing a sensible new Guideline section that would
punish "receipt" and "possession" equally.4 3 The Commission's propo-
sal would punish "receiving," "possessing," and "transporting" child
result of a drafting mistake." Id. at 770. But, ultimately, the court felt it was "not in a position to
rewrite § 2252A(a)(2)(A) so that it accords with what Congress might have intended." Id.
38. See United States v. Andersson, 803 F.2d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Miller, 776 F.2d 978, 979-80 (11th Cir. 1985).
39. See, e.g., Andersson, 803 F.2d at 906 ("The language of the statute is unambiguous. It
extends to any mailing or receipt of pornographic literature involving children: commercial or
non-commercial, public or private.").
40. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 323(a), 104 Stat. 4816, 4818 (1990).
41. After the 1990 amendment, § 2252(a)(4)(B) punished "[a]ny person who ... knowingly
possesseld] 3 or more" items of child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (1990). Eventually,
however, Congress adopted a "zero tolerance" policy towards child pornography and punished the
possession of any child pornography, not just "three or more items." See The Protection of
Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 203(b)(1) (1998).
42. HISTORY, supra note 5, at 17.
43. Id. at 18-19.
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pornography under § 2G2.4, which imposed no mandatory minimum
sentence."" The new Guideline would continue to punish offenders
intending to traffic child pornography under § 2G2.2, which carried a
mandatory minimum five-year sentence.4 5 Thus, the Commission's pro-
posal logically sought to punish personal-use receivers and possessors
equally, but less severely than those who distribute.
However, the Commission's rational new scheme was upended by
an amendment included in an appropriations bill introduced by Senator
Jesse Helms of North Carolina.46 The amendment was never debated
and it forced the Commission to punish "receipt" convictions under
§ 2G2.2." Before the amendment passed, the Chairman of the Sentenc-
ing Commission wrote a letter to Congress that objected to the amend-
ment and justified the rationale behind the proposed Guideline
changes.48 In the letter, Chairman Wilkens explained the purpose of
§ 2G2.4 as follows:
[I]n keeping with the overarching congressional mandate to ensure
that defendants who commit similar offense conduct are treated simi-
larly under the guidelines, the Commission determined that the new
guideline should encompass other conduct of comparable seriousness
to the new statutorily-created offense (simple possession of child por-
nography) that was formerly sentenced under § 2G2.2, including sim-
ple receipt. Recognizing that receipt is a logical predicate to
possession, the Commission concluded that the guideline sentence in
such cases should not turn on the timing or nature of law enforcement
intervention, but rather on the gravity of the underlying conduct."9
The Chairman went on to warn that Senator Helms's amendment would
"reintroduce sentencing disparity among similar defendants and render
the guidelines susceptible to plea bargaining manipulation." 0
After almost two decades, it is quite clear that the Chairman's fears
have become a reality. The U.S. Sentencing Commission recently fin-
ished a full-scale review of the child pornography Guidelines that ended
May 1, 2010.1' Despite its apparent focus on child pornography, the
Commission failed to generate any proposed amendments to those
Guidelines.5 2 But even if the Commission had re-proposed the Guideline
change envisioned by Chairman Wilkens in the early 1990s, Congress
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See 137 CONG. REc. S10356-01, S10363 (vote on Amendment 780).
47. See 137 CONG. REc. S10322-04, S10322-23.
48. 137 CONG. REc. H6736-02 (1991) (letter from Chairman Wilkens).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. HISTORY, supra note 5, at 54.
52. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 76 Fed. Reg. 3193-02 (Jan. 19,
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would still need to repeal Senator Helms's amendment to authorize
equal punishment for "receiving" and "possessing" child pornography.
Indeed, without congressional action, the Commission cannot change the
fact that "receipt" is punished under § 2G2.2-perhaps the Guidelines'
most influential flaw.
Unfortunately, child pornography is a political hot potato and any
proposed bill seen as "soft" on these offenders has almost no chance of
passage. The controversy surrounding child pornography will very likely
stall any efforts to reform a guideline structure that results in disparate
sentencing-an outcome at odds with the very purpose of the Guide-
lines. As Chairman Wilkens noted in his letter, "[o]ne primary reason
Congress created the Sentencing Commission was to devise guidelines
that avoid these unwarranted variations in sentencing for similar con-
duct."53 If Congress fails to act, these unwarranted variations will con-
tinue and the integrity of child pornography sentencing will suffer as a
result.
III. "RECEIPT" AND "POSSESSION": THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROBLEM
A. Blockburger and Ball: The Basis for Double Jeopardy Protection
The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause protects defend-
ants from being punished twice for the same criminal offense. 54 To
determine whether two statutory provisions proscribe a single criminal
offense, courts apply the same-elements test established by the Supreme
Court in Blockburger v. United States." Under the Blockburger test,
"where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a
fact which the other does not."5 Inherent in the Blockburger test is a
presumption that the legislature does not ordinarily intend to impose two
punishments when different statutory provisions prohibit the same
offense.57 But "[t]he Blockburger test is a 'rule of statutory construc-
tion,' and because it serves as a means of discerning congressional pur-
pose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a
clear indication of contrary legislative intent."" In other words, the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent Congress from proscribing
2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/FederalRegister-Notices/20110119_Noticeof_
ProposedAmendments.pdf.
53. 137 CONG. REc. H6736-02 (1991) (letter from Chairman Wilkens).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
55. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
56. Id. at 304.
57. Id.
58. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981).
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multiple punishments for the same offense as long as it clearly intends to
do so. Of course, the problem is, Congress does not always clearly
express its intent.
Courts "have often concluded that two different statutes define the
'same offense' . . . because one is a lesser included offense of the
other."" This occurs when the elements required to prove one offense
are subsumed in another distinct offense that requires proof of additional
elements. Under the Blockburger rule, if a statutory provision proscribes
an offense that is a lesser-included offense of another, then convictions
under both offenses are presumed to violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. To overcome the Blockburger presumption, Congress must
clearly intend to impose separate punishments for the greater offense
and the lesser-included offense.
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the lesser-included offense
issue in a variety of different contexts.o However, in United States v.
Ball, the Court specifically addressed the application of Blockburger to
statutory provisions prohibiting "receipt" and "possession."' In Ball, a
felon was convicted of "receiving" a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(h) and "possessing" the same firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1202(a)(1). 6 2 After applying Blockburger, the Court found it "clear
that Congress did not intend to subject felons to two convictions"
because "proof of illegal receipt of a firearm necessarily includes proof
of illegal possession of that weapon." 63 As a result, Ball's convictions
for "receipt" and "possession" violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and
the Court remanded so that one of those convictions could be vacated.6
The Court made it clear that the government could prosecute defendants
for "receipt" and "possession," but convictions on both counts could not
be imposed.65 This was true even though the defendant's convictions
were to run concurrently.66
Ball is the only Supreme Court case addressing Double Jeopardy
protection for defendants convicted of "receiving" and "possessing"
59. Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996).
60. See, e.g., id. (conspiracy was a lesser included offense of conducting a continuing
criminal enterprise); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693-94 (1980) (rape was a lesser
included offense of murder committed in the course of rape); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167
(1977) (joyriding was a lesser included offense of auto theft).
61. 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
62. Id. at 857.
63. Id. at 862.
64. Id. at 865.
65. Id. at 861 ("To say that a convicted felon may be prosecuted simultaneously for violation
of [both offenses], however, is not to say that he may be convicted and punished for two
offenses.").
66. Id. at 865 ("The separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential
adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.").
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contraband. But the Ball decision left many questions unanswered and
the scope of Double Jeopardy protection in this context is still unclear.
Most importantly, the Court did not decide whether a defendant could be
convicted under both provisions if "he received and possessed different
weapons at different times or in various places." 67 Ball simply decided
that a defendant could not be convicted for "receiving" and "possessing"
the same gun. But what if Ball had received ten guns in a suitcase that he
continuously possessed until the police apprehended him? Would that
change the result in Ball? That question becomes more complicated
when you consider that the statutes at issue in Ball punished the
"receipt" and "possession" of "any" firearm. This statutory ambiguity
implicates another criminal law doctrine, the rule of lenity, which will
be discussed in the next section.
B. Ball and Bell: Double Jeopardy and the Rule of Lenity Converge
The rule of lenity dictates that, "[w]hen Congress leaves to the
Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambi-
guity should be resolved in favor of lenity." 68 The rule of lenity rests on
the notion that courts should not impose penalties more severe than the
legislature intends. This doctrine has been applied in cases where it is
impossible to discern the proper unit of prosecution for a proscribed
criminal offense. In Bell, the defendant was convicted on two counts of
knowingly transporting two women in interstate commerce for the pur-
pose of prostitution in violation of the Mann Act.6 9 The Mann Act pun-
ished "whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce
. . . any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution."o The Court
invoked the rule of lenity and reversed one the defendant's convictions
because the Mann Act ambiguously defined the unit of prosecution by
using the phrase "any woman or girl."'
After Bell, use of "the word 'any' has typically been found ambigu-
ous in connection with the allowable unit of prosecution, for it contem-
plates the plural, rather than specifying the singular."72 For example, it is
unlawful for a convicted felon to "possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition.""
67. Id. at 859, n.6.
68. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
69. Id. at 82.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 83-84.
72. United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1014 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotes omitted).
Accord Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958); United States v. Deaton, 468 F.2d 541 (5th
Cir. 1972).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2008) (emphasis added). Section 922(g)(1) is the predecessor to
§ 922(h), one of the statutes at issue in Ball.
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Applying the principle of lenity established in Bell, the Circuits "are in
agreement that the allowable unit of prosecution under § 922(g) is the
incident of possession, regardless of whether a defendant possessed
more than one firearm, or possessed a firearm and ammunition."" Like-
wise, a defendant who receives multiple weapons at the same time can-
not be convicted on two counts.
When a statute punishes "receipt" and "possession" of "any" con-
traband, the principles established in Ball and Bell become intertwined.
At a minimum, Ball stands for the proposition that receipt and continu-
ous possession of a firearm is a single criminal act intended by the legis-
lature to result in one punishment. Applied more generally, Ball
supports the idea that possession of contraband is a continuous offense
that is triggered the moment receipt occurs. When coupled with the rule
of lenity, the fundamental proposition stated in Ball should apply
equally where the defendant possesses numerous units of contraband
received at once. That is, each conviction must rest on an instance of
receipt from which the possession stems.
Consider again the hypothetical defendant who is caught in posses-
sion of a suitcase filled with ten guns. Assuming he received the suitcase
and all the guns inside at the same time, the holdings in Ball and Bell
should combine to bar convictions for "receipt" and "possession" on
double jeopardy grounds. Otherwise, the prosecution could circumvent
the double jeopardy protection afforded to the defendant in Ball by
offering five guns to prove "receipt" and five guns to prove "posses-
sion," even though the defendant acquired all of the guns through a sin-
gle act.
A more difficult question would arise if the defendant possessed the
suitcase full of guns but acquired the weapons at different times. This
would seemingly distinguish Ball because the defendant no longer
acquired all of the guns through a single act. In fact, that distinction was
made before Ball was even decided. Prior to Ball, the Circuits agreed
that separate instances of receipt or storage were necessary to support
multiple convictions under the federal statutes prohibiting felons from
"receiving" and "possessing" firearms.7 6 In United States v. Bullock, the
Fifth Circuit defended this statutory construction as follows:
Common sense and logic . . . will not support a holding that the
receipt of firearms at separate times must merge into one possession,
74. United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2009).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 1982).
76. See United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 455 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Wiga,
662 F.2d 1325, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 350, 351-352 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715, 721 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 869 (7th Cir. 1975).
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thus, one offense. In addressing this evil, could Congress have
intended to deter receipt as well as possession of firearms by con-
victed felons and yet design the statute to only allow one punishment
no matter how many separate receipts and possessions occurred? We
think not. Any other determination would allow convicted felons and
terrorists to establish armories where all of their weapons would be
kept. The person in custody of the armory would then be subject to
only a single charge of possession, although thousands of illegal and
dangerous weapons were received and stockpiled at different times. 7
To be sure, a statutory scheme that does not link punishment to the num-
ber of contraband items acquired is undesirable. But if Congress wanted
to punish those who stockpile weapons more severely, why did it use the
patently ambiguous term, "any," to define the relevant unit of prosecu-
tion for both "receipt" and "possession?" The Fifth Circuit was justifia-
bly concerned that a defendant who acquired an armory would be
punished the same as a defendant who receives and possesses a single
firearm. But the court's holding does not completely prevent that result
because a criminal can simply acquire their stockpile of weapons all at
once and avoid multiple convictions.
Admittedly, it is extremely unlikely for a defendant to acquire a
stockpile of weapons through one massive instance of "receipt." But that
is not the point. The court's decision in Bullock rested on the notion that
there should be a linear relationship between the number of guns
received and the amount of punishment imposed. But the problem with
Bullock is that it fashions a middle ground where sometimes there is a
linear relationship between the number of guns received and the number
of convictions imposed-but that will not always be true. For example,
imagine two defendants. The first is caught with two firearms under his
mattress and the second is caught with thirty in his closet. There is clear
evidence that the first defendant acquired one firearm on Monday and
the other on Tuesday. There is no evidence regarding when the second
defendant acquired any of his thirty firearms. Under Bullock, the first
defendant may be convicted on two counts but the second may only be
convicted on one count. Does it make any sense to impose twice the
punishment on the first defendant in this situation?
Perhaps the argument can be made that Congress intended to pun-
ish each act of "receipt" to deter separate instances of transfer. But that
argument fails to consider the gravamen of "receipt" and "possession"
offenses generally and Congress's specific intent "to keep firearms away
from the persons . . . classified as potentially irresponsible and danger-
77. United States v. Bullock, 615 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (5th Cir. 1980).
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ous."7 8 Consider who is more dangerous: The felon who receives thirty
firearms at once or the felon who receives two firearms on separate
dates? Because the statute ambiguously defines the relevant unit of pros-
ecution for both "receipt" and "possession," the Judiciary is tasked with
choosing between two dissatisfactory options. If separate instances of
"receipt" are merged into a single count, more culpable defendants
receive relatively less punishment. On the other hand, if separate
instances of "receipt" constitute separate convictions, some defendants
will inevitably be subjected to harsher punishment than they really
deserve, simply because they acquired their firearms at different times.
Choosing the latter option, as the court did in Bullock, is inconsistent
with the overarching policy behind the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity
is rooted in the Judiciary's reluctance to impose a punishment more
severe than the legislature intended. It follows that making an arbitrary
choice between two options, one making punishment more severe and
the other less severe, should be resolved in favor of the more lenient
option. 9
Courts are similarly tasked with choosing between these two
options when defendants are convicted for "receiving" and/or "possess-
ing" child pornography in violation of § 2252. But, in the context of
child pornography, the choice made between the two options has more
significant ramifications on sentencing because of the differences in
punishment for "receipt" and "possession." The next section of this Note
will analyze the recent line of child pornography cases applying Ball to
dual convictions for "receipt" and "possession." A review of those cases
reveals that the analysis conducted above regarding the firearm statutes
at issue in Ball applies equally to § 2252's provisions punishing
"receipt" and "possession" of child pornography.
C. 18 U.S.C. § 2252: Put to the (Blockburger) Test
Many federal child pornography cases proceed in a similar fashion.
Defendants access a website or file-sharing program and download
images or videos onto their computer. Once that occurs, law enforce-
ment authorities are able to track the defendant's Internet Protocol ("IP")
address and, eventually, their residence. After obtaining a search war-
rant, authorities search the residence and inevitably find a computer with
images of child pornography stored on the hard drive. Defendants
78. Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976) (discussing the legislative history of
the Gun Control Act).
79. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958) (The "policy of lenity means that the
Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an
individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended.").
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caught in this fashion are therefore in "possession" of child pornography
on their hard drive. There is also evidence that the defendant "received"
the child pornography because law enforcement authorities are capable
of accurately pinpointing when the download occurred. Thus, the typical
downloader can easily be prosecuted and convicted of "receipt" and/or
"possession."so
The Ninth Circuit was the first to address whether "possessing"
child pornography was a lesser included offense of "receiving" child
pornography under Blockburger. In United States v. Davenport,1
authorities learned that Davenport had accessed a file-sharing program
to download images of child pornography.8 2 A search of Davenport's
computer revealed 496 images and 334 videos containing child pornog-
raphy. Davenport was charged with "receiving" and "possessing" child
pornography and pled guilty to both counts.8 4 On appeal, Davenport
challenged his convictions on double jeopardy grounds. As a matter of
first impression, the Ninth Circuit applied the Blockburger test and con-
cluded that "a conviction for receipt necessarily includes proof of the
elements required for conviction under possession, and possession is a
lesser included offense of receipt."" Like the Court in Ball, the Ninth
Circuit accepted the "basic proposition that . . . [iut is impossible to
'receive' something without, at least at the very instant of 'receipt,' also
'possessing' it."8 6 As a result, the court held that Davenport's convic-
tions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. In accordance with the
remedy supplied in Ball, the court remanded so that the district court
could vacate one of Davenport's convictions.
One member of the three-judge panel in Davenport dissented from
the majority's opinion on two separate grounds.8 9 The dissent first
rejected the majority's Blockburger analysis of § 2252A because it did
not take into account subsection (d), which provides an affirmative
80. In 2006, over ninety-five percent of federal child pornography cases resulted in a
conviction. MonvANs & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 2, at 6.
81. 519 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2008).
82. Id. at 942.
83. Id.
84. Id. Davenport was charged with "receiving" child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(2) and "possessing" child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
Throughout this Note, I have referred to § 2252, not § 2252A. However, it is important to note
that § 2252A is materially identical to § 2252. Section 2252A was enacted in 1996 as part of the
Child Pornography Prevention Act and it essentially mirrors § 2252. See S. REP. No. 104-358, at 9
(1996). Therefore, analysis of § 2252A and § 2252 can proceed in the same fashion.
85. Davenport, 519 F.3d at 945.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 944.
88. Id. at 948.
89. Id.
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defense for "possession" but not "receipt." Section 2252A(d) makes it
an affirmative defense to possess less than three images, provided that
the defendant promptly destroys the images or notifies a law enforce-
ment agency.90 When comparing two different statutory provisions to
determine if one requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the
dissent argued that affirmative defenses should be part of the Block-
burger analysis.9" Therefore, the dissent would have effectively read the
affirmative defense into the statute as an actual element of the crime.
The dissent opined that "[t]he crime of possession requires proof that the
defendant possessed three or more images or failed to delete the images
or inform the police about them."9 2 Because "receipt" did not require
proof of any of these facts, the dissent maintained that there was no
double jeopardy problem under Blockburger.
But the majority took a different approach when considering how
affirmative defenses should factor into the Blockburger test. The major-
ity focused on the fact that the government is not required to prove an
affirmative defense at all; a fact completely overlooked by the dissent."
To be sure, the government is not burdened with proving the nonexis-
tence of an affirmative defense.9 4 In fact, if it were, the affirmative
defense would morph into an element of the crime itself. The majority
correctly concluded that § 2252A(d)'s affirmative defense did not
require proof of a fact needed for "possession" that was not required for
"receipt."" As a result, a majority of the Ninth Circuit was convinced
that the statute was problematic under Blockburger.
The dissent in Davenport also disagreed with the majority's conclu-
sion that Congress did not clearly intend to create multiple punishments
for "receipt" and "possession" of child pornography. 9 6 The dissent
stressed, and the majority acknowledged, that even if the "receipt" and
"possession" provisions of § 2252 were problematic under Blockburger;
the court could still impose two punishments if Congress intended to.97
But the majority and the dissent essentially disagreed about the clarity
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d) (2008).
91. United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2008).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 945.
94. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) ("Proof of the nonexistence of all
affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required.").
95. Davenport, 519 F.3d at 945 ("The factual prerequisites of [the affirmative defense]-
namely, that the defendant possessed fewer than three images of child pornography and, among
other things, promptly either took reasonable steps to destroy each image or reported the matter to
law enforcement-are not facts that require proof under Blockburger at all.").
96. Id. at 946 ("We disagree with the dissent's conclusion that Congress has 'clearly
expressed' a 'legislative intention to the contrary."').
97. Id. at 946, 949.
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with which Congress must express its intent when authorizing multiple
punishments for the same offense." At its core, this is a disagreement
about the effect of Blockburger and the weight of the presumption its
test creates. The majority concluded, "the presumption against multiple
punishment arising from a Blockburger analysis could be overcome by a
clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary."99 The dissenting
judge criticized this reading because, in her view, it "improperly views
'the application of the Blockburger rule as a conclusive determinant of
legislative intent, rather than as a useful canon of statutory construc-
tion.'"'"1 But the Blockburger test becomes a "useful canon of statutory
construction" instead of conclusive if, and only if, there are other clear
indicators of congressional intent that rebut the presumption against
imposing multiple punishments.o' So what indicators of congressional
intent can the courts look to and how clear do they have to be to over-
come the Blockburger presumption? That is the key question and one
that split the court in Davenport.
The dissent looked at two different indicators to reach the conclu-
sion that "Congress clearly intended to permit cumulative punishment
for receipt of child pornography and possession of child pornogra-
phy." 10 2 The dissent would have authorized multiple punishments
because "Congress plainly authorized cumulative punishments when it
enacted the law in 1996" and "amended the statute to 'get tougher' on
child pornography crimes."10 3 Those indicators were not conclusive
enough to persuade the majority that Congress clearly intended to
impose multiple punishments for "receipt" and "possession" under
§ 2252.'0 The majority was particularly concerned that Congress never
"frame[d] receipt and possession as two distinct harms."' But the dis-
senting judge opined that an express statutory provision authorizing
98. Id. at 946 ("[N]owhere in its congressional findings does Congress explicitly frame
receipt and possession as two distinct harms; the dissent's characterization of two distinct harms
emanating from receipt and possession, while perhaps reasonable, is superimposed onto
Congress's findings. An equally plausible interpretation of Congress's findings is that the harms
Congress identified emanate from the general existence of child pornography, and relate
simultaneously to both receipt and possession of those illicit materials."). Contra id. at 950
("Congress explicitly found that child pornography causes many harms. Some of those harms are
caused by receipt but not by possession, and others are caused by possession but not by receipt.").
99. Id. at 947.
100. Id. at 951 (quoting Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985)).
101. See, e.g., Garrett, 472 U.S. at 471, 779 (The "Blockburger rule is not controlling when the
legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history"); Missouri v.
Hunter, 559 U.S. 359, 368 (1983); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981); Whalen
v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1980).
102. United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 2008).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 946.
105. Id.
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multiple punishments is not necessary for courts to impose them, and
criticized the majority for searching for clearer provisions1 o
To be sure, an express provision authorizing multiple punishments
is not necessary to overcome a Blockburger presumption.10 7 But some
aspect of legislative history must demonstrate that "the two statutory
provisions are 'directed to separate evils' or address 'diverse societal
harms.' " The dissent found that "receipt" and "possession" of child
pornography implicated distinct harms because "[s]ome . . . harms are
caused by receipt but not by possession, and others are caused by pos-
session but not by receipt."' 09 The dissent offered no explanation for this
statement but other courts have acknowledged a distinction between the
two offenses when confronted with Guideline challenges."o Some
courts distinguish "receipt" and "possession" on the grounds that
"receiving" child pornography fosters the market for this material and
keeps producers in business."
It is difficult to see how receivers increase the demand for child
pornography but possessors do not. The distinction is purely semantic.
Defendants "receive" child pornography for two reasons: (1) they want
to possess it for personal use, or (2) they want to sell or trade it. There-
fore, anyone who "receives" child pornography must be guilty of either
possession or trafficking. Traffickers promote the further dissemination
of child pornography and increase its availability to others. But per-
sonal-use receivers/possessors do not directly increase the availability of
child pornography to others. They are, instead, the end-users that sup-
port the traffickers and keep them in business. Those who "receive" and
continuously "possess" child pornography for personal use do not
increase the market for child pornography any more than those who
"receive" it and instantaneously discard it. Therefore, § 2252's "receipt"
and "possession" provisions cannot be directed at separate evils because
106. Id. at 951.
107. See, e.g., Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778-86 (1985).
108. United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ball v. United
States, 470 U.S. 856, 864 (1985); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981)).
109. Davenport, 519 F.3d at 950.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 355 F.3d 1040, 1043 (7th Cir. 2004) ("possession and
receipt are not the same conduct and threaten distinct harms"); United States v. Grosenheider, 200
F.3d 321, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2000) ("It is clear that Congress established a series of distinctly
separate offenses respecting child pornography, with higher sentences for offenses involving
conduct more likely to be, or more directly, harmful to minors than the mere possession offense");
United States v. Ellison, 113 F.3d 77, 81 (7th Cir. 1997) (Guideline § 2G2.2 punishes "receipt"
more severely that "possession" because "receiving" child pornography "creates or strengthens the
market for child pornography" and "receipt of the prohibited materials for personal use, without
more, keeps producers and distributors of this filth in business.").
111. See, e.g., Ellison, 113 F.3d at 81.
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the harm that flows from "receipt" is necessarily committed by the pos-
sessors at some earlier time.
It is interesting that the dissent in Davenport cited Ball to suggest
that Congress must show an intent to create punishments directed at two
separate evils. This is because, in Ball, the Supreme Court specifically
found that overlapping "receipt" and "possession" statutes were "simply
not 'directed to separate evils.' 11 2 The Court in Ball by no means sug-
gested that all statutes punishing "receipt" and "possession" of contra-
band punish the same evil. But one would think that, in light of Ball,
Congress would offer more clarity if it truly intended to impose multiple
punishments for "receipt" and "possession" of contraband. After all, a
unanimous Court in Ball concluded: "Congress seems clearly to have
recognized that a felon who receives a firearm must also possess it, and
thus had no intention of subjecting that person to two convictions for the
same criminal act." 13 It is safe to assume that Congress was aware of
Ball when possession of child pornography was criminalized in 1990.
Therefore, if Congress wanted to address some distinct evil caused by
"possession" that did not extend to "receipt," it would have or should
have expressed itself more clearly. That is precisely what Blockburger
requires. Because Congress did not clearly frame "receipt" and "posses-
sion" as distinct evils, it is much more likely that § 2252's "possession"
provision addressed the same evil as the already enacted "receipt" provi-
sion. As discussed in Part II, the "possession" provision was added so
that personal-use possessors were punished under § 2252 in addition to
personal-use receivers. Congress did not want the timing of law enforce-
ment intervention to determine who could be punished. If anything, this
indicates that Congress recognized the inherent nexus between the two
offenses.
Since Davenport, no court applying Blockburger to § 2252 has
come to the dissent's conclusion in that case. Other Ninth Circuit deci-
sions have affirmed the Davenport majority's Blockburger analysis.114
These decisions recognize that it is per se double jeopardy error to con-
vict defendants of both "receiving" and "possessing" the same images of
child pornography, no matter how large the collection. In Giberson, a
search of the defendant's computer "revealed more than 700 images of
child pornography.""' 5 In Brobst, officers found twenty-eight printed
pages of child pornography at the defendant's residence.' Therefore, at
112. Ball, 470 U.S. at 864 (quoting Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 343).
113. Id. at 862.
114. United States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d
882 (9th Cir. 2008).
115. Giberson, 527 F.3d at 885.
116. Brobst, 558 F.3d at 988.
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least in the Ninth Circuit, Defendants cannot be convicted for "receipt"
and "possession" of the same images of child pornography.
Soon after Davenport, the Third Circuit held that "possessing"
child pornography is a lesser included offense of "receiving" child por-
nography under Blockburger in United States v. Miller." The Third
Circuit did not discuss the Davenport decision but found Ball control-
ling to its Blockburger analysis." 8 In Miller, the defendant was found
guilty of "receiving" twenty images of child pornography and "possess-
ing" the same twenty images.' The Third Circuit held that "the double
jeopardy clause barred convictions for both receiving and possessing the
same images of child pornography."' 2 0
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit qualified its holding by
stating that "receipt" and "possession" convictions violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause when they were based on the "same images." 2' The
court in Miller remanded the case to the district court so that it could
vacate one of the defendant's convictions.' 2 2 Consistent with Ball, the
court in Miller let the "the District Court . . . exercise its discretion to
vacate one of the underlying convictions." 23
D. Prosecutorial Manipulation of Double Jeopardy Protection
In Ball, the discretion given to the district court to vacate either
conviction was essentially trivial because felons convicted of "receiv-
ing" or "possessing" firearms were not subject to radically different
mandatory punishments. But in child pornography cases, the district
court's decision to vacate either conviction becomes extremely conse-
quential. In Miller and Davenport, the Third and Ninth Circuits effec-
tively stripped the government's unwarranted power to determine the
defendants' sentence by seeking convictions for "receipt" and "posses-
sion." By allowing the sentencing judge discretion to vacate "receipt"
convictions on remand, the remedy in Miller and Davenport allows the
judge to avoid the harsh five-year mandatory minimum if the facts so
warrant. Such a result is desirable, particularly when "the Court finds
that the mandatory minimum exceeds a fair and just sentence that is
sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with" the sentencing
117. 527 F.3d 54, 72 (3d Cir. 2008).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 58.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 74.
123. Id. (quoting Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864 (1985)).
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factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).124 This properly restores sentencing
authority with the Judiciary and avoids arbitrary manipulation of
§ 2252's ambiguity by the Executive.
But prosecutors can avoid the result in Miller and Davenport and
ensure that defendants receive the five-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence imposed for "receipt" convictions. In United States v. Bobb' 25 and
United States v. Polouizzi,126 the Eleventh and Second Circuits
addressed the double jeopardy issues implicated by § 2252. In both
cases, the government found the defendant in possession of a collection
of child pornography images and videos that were downloaded. 1 2 7 The
government then used some files from the collection to prove "receipt"
on specific dates and other files to prove "possession" on a later date. 128
By charging defendants this way, the government was able to obtain
convictions for both "receipt" and "possession" without violating the
double jeopardy principles laid out in Miller and Davenport.129 In Bobb,
the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Miller and Davenport on the grounds
that "receipt" and "possession" occurred on different dates as alleged in
the indictment. 3 o In Polouizzi, the Second Circuit distinguished Miller
and Davenport on the grounds that different images were used to prove
"receipt" and "possession."l3 1 But a closer analysis of Bobb and
Polouizzi reveals that distinguishing Miller and Davenport on these
grounds does not adequately protect defendants from double jeopardy.
The prosecutorial approach used in Bobb and Polouizzi simply allows
the government to arbitrarily manipulate the rule in Blockburger.
In Bobb, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") discovered
that an individual in Miami, Florida downloaded seven zip files and
numerous picture files of child pornography from a website.13 2 The FBI
eventually traced that activity to the defendant's residence and obtained
a search warrant for his apartment.' 33 During the search, the FBI discov-
ered 6124 images and seven "zip files" containing child pornography on
124. United States v. Szymanski, No. 08-CR-417, 2009 WL 1212252, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Apr.
30, 2009).
125. 577 F.3d 1366 (11 th Cir. 2009). I feel obligated to disclose that I assisted Bobb's counsel
after the Eleventh Circuit's decision. Bobb filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court challenging his convictions on double jeopardy grounds. The Court ordered
the Solicitor General to respond to the petition, indicating that the arguments raised and the issued
presented warranted further briefing. The Court eventually denied Bobb's petition.
126. 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009).
127. Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1368; Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 147.
128. Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1369-70; Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 147-48.
129. Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1371; Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 150.
130. Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1375.
131. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 159.
132. Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1368.
133. Id.
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the defendant's laptop computer.' 34 The indictment charged the defen-
dant "with one count of 'receiving' child pornography on November 12,
2004, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) and one count of
knowingly 'possessing' child pornography on August 4, 2005, in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)."13 5 At trial, the Government used
the seven zip files downloaded on November 12, 2004 to prove the
"receiving" count and the additional images found during the execution
of the search warrant to prove the "possession" count.3 6 A jury found
the defendant guilty on both counts and the district court sentenced him
to "ninety-six months' imprisonment and five years' supervised
release."13 7
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the defendant's initial
argument that "possession" is a lesser-included offense of "receipt"
under Blockburger and Ball.'3 8 However, the court eventually affirmed
both of Bobb's convictions. The court distinguished Ball, Miller, Daven-
port, Giberson, and Brobst on the grounds that the defendant's convic-
tions "were based on two distinct offenses, occurring on two different
dates, and proscribed by two different statutes."913 The Bobb court failed
to fully examine the complexity of this issue by distinguishing these
authorities on the grounds that "receipt" and "possession" allegedly
occurred on "two different dates." The fact that the defendant "received"
and "possessed" child pornography on two separate dates does not dis-
tinguish Miller, Davenport, Giberson, or Brobst. In each case, the defen-
dant "possessed" images that were "received" at an earlier time. Unless
the defendant is caught in possession of images on the same day he
receives them, the date of "receipt" and "possession" will always
diverge. Thus, there is no distinction between the facts in Bobb and the
authorities distinguished by the Eleventh Circuit.
The only distinction that can be drawn between Bobb and the other
cases is the indictment. The indictment in Bobb charged the defendant
with "receipt" on a specific date and "possession" around the time the
search was conducted.' 40 The Government broke up the collection of
images found in Bobb's possession during the search and offered some
134. Id. at 1368.
135. Id. at 1369-70.
136. Id. at 1370.
137. Id. at 1371.
138. Id. at 1375.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1369-70 ("[A] federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Bobb with one
count of 'receiving' child pornography on November 12, 2004, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(2)(B) ('Count I'), and one count of knowingly 'possessing' child pornography on
August 4, 2005, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) ('Count II').").
2011] 1049
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
images to prove "receipt" and others to prove "possession."' 4 ' The same
could have been done in Miller, Davenport, Giberson, or Brobst. Thus,
the court in Bobb allowed the government to circumvent the double
jeopardy protection afforded in those cases. Any time a defendant pos-
sesses multiple images, the government will be able to follow this
approach and obtain convictions for "receipt" and "possession." This
ultimately allows the prosecutor to determine the defendant's minimum
sentence because it leaves judges no choice but to sentence the offender
to five years imprisonment-even if such a sentence is extremely exces-
sive in light of the defendant's conduct.
In Polouizzi, the Second Circuit sanctioned an approach to prosecu-
tion similar to the approach used in Bobb. The defendant in Polouizzi
was charged with twelve counts of "receipt" and eleven counts of "pos-
session."l 42 The "possession" counts were based on images the defen-
dant possessed when the authorities searched his home.14 3 The "receipt"
counts charged the defendant with receiving images on four different
dates prior the search of his home." Seven of the images used to prove
"receipt" were also used to prove "possession."' 4 5 The jury convicted
the defendant on all counts.1 6
Before trial, the defendant requested that the jury "be informed of
the statutory mandatory minimum (five years) and maximum (twenty
years) sentence" that accompany "receipt" convictions under
§ 2252(a)(2).' 47 The court rejected that request and allowed the trial to
proceed. After the jury reached its verdict the court gave each juror an
opportunity to express his or her view on how the defendant should be
punished.148 Five of the jurors expressly told the court that the defendant
should receive compulsory mental heath treatment instead of incarcera-
tion. 4 9 Four of those five jurors told the court that they would have
found the defendant not guilty had they known the mandatory minimum
and maximum punishments for the "receipt" convictions. 5 o The defen-
dant moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
141. Id. at 1370 ("[Tlhe evidence the Government planned to use to prove Count I, the
receiving' count, was the seven zip files that Bobb had allegedly downloaded from the Center's
website on November 12, 2004, and the rest of the images would be used to prove Count II, the
possessing' count.").
142. United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 2009).
143. Id. at 148.
144. Id. at 147.




148. Id. at 150.
149. Id. at 151.
150. Id.
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Criminal Procedure based on the fact that the court refused to inform the
jury of the mandatory punishments when it had the discretion to do
so.'5 The court granted the defendant's "motion for a new trial on the
receipt counts," conceding "that it had erred in refusing to advise the
jury of the mandatory minimum sentence for those counts."l5 2
On appeal by defendant and cross-appeal by the government, the
Second Circuit addressed the double jeopardy issues implicated by the
defendant's convictions.' The court began by accepting the defen-
dant's argument "that Congress intended to subject a person who simul-
taneously possesses multiple [images] of child pornography to only one
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)."l 54 Indeed, "the plain lan-
guage of the statute provides that a person who possesses '1 or more'
matters containing a prohibited image has violated the statute only
once."15 5 Therefore, the district court was instructed to vacate all but one
of the defendant's convictions for "possession" on remand.' 56
Even though no "receipt" convictions were entered against the
defendant, the court decided to address the defendant's double jeopardy
argument as to the "receipt" counts "in view of the fact that the district
court [was] likely to be faced with [those] issues on remand."' Because
Congress criminalized the "receipt" of "any" images of child pornogra-
phy, the court invoked the rule of lenity and concluded "that a person
who receives multiple prohibited images in a single transaction can only
be charged with a single violation of § 2252(a)(2)."' 5 ' Therefore,
according to the Second Circuit, evidence that the defendant
downloaded images on four separate days "would appear to support [the
defendant's] conviction on four receipt counts-one for each date on
which he received images-but not multiple receipt counts per day."159
The court then addressed the defendant's Blockburger argument
that he could not be convicted of both "receipt" and "possession." The
court found "Davenport and Miller persuasive" and acknowledged that
another case from the Second Circuit already assumed that "possessing"
child pornography is a lesser-included offense of "receiving" it."'o How-
ever, the court in Polouizzi distinguished Davenport and Miller on the
grounds that four of the files used to prove "possession" were not used
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 153-59.
154. Id. at 155.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 157.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 158.
159. Id. at 158.
160. Id. at 159 (citing United States v. Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2009)).
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to prove "receipt." 61 Therefore, the court held that Blockburger did not
apply because, "[i]n such circumstances, it would appear that Congress
intended to allow separate convictions."16 2
E. In Search of a Consistent Judicial Approach
The courts in Davenport, Miller, Bobb and Polouizzi have estab-
lished four general principles that apply in cases where defendants are
charged with "receiving" and "possessing" multiple images of child
pornography:
1. First Principle: The rule of lenity permits only one "posses-
sion" conviction when a defendant possesses multiple
images. 163
2. Second Principle: The rule of lenity permits only one "receipt"
conviction when a defendant receives multiple images in one
"transaction."16
3. Third Principle: Defendants can only be convicted of "receipt"
and "possession" if the dates alleged for "receipt" and "posses-
sion" are different. 165
4. Fourth Principle: Defendants can only be convicted of
"receipt" and "possession" if the images offered to prove
"receipt" are different from the images offered to prove
"possession."l66
When combined, these four principles have several consequences that
can be illustrated using hypothetical situations.
First, imagine a defendant who downloads one large file folder that
contains thirty images of child pornography on January 1st. The govern-
ment searches the defendant's house on February 1st and finds all thirty
images stored on his computer. The government proceeds to charge the
defendant with "possession" of fifteen images of child pornography on
February 1st and "receipt" of fifteen images of child pornography on
January 1st. At trial, the government simply does not attempt to prove
when the fifteen images offered to prove "possession" were received.
The defendant is then convicted on both counts. There is no double jeop-
ardy error in this scenario under current law because the alleged dates of
"receipt" and "possession" are different and the images used to prove
''receipt" are different from the images used to prove "possession."
161. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 159.
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 155.
164. Id. at 158.
165. United States v. Bobb, 577 F.3d 1366, 1375 (11th Cir. 2009).
166. Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1375; Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 159; United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54,
72 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2008).
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These convictions would satisfy the four established principles. How-
ever, this hypothetical demonstrates how the government can use the
indictment to arbitrarily manipulate the holdings in Miller and Daven-
port when defendants receive multiple images at once and continuously
possesses those same images.
At a bare minimum, the government should be required to prove
separate acts of "receipt" to obtain two convictions. This is precisely
what was required of the government when prosecuting felons for
"receiving" and "possessing" firearms."' In Bobb and Polouizzi, the
courts improperly focused on the fact that the dates for "receipt" and
''possession" were different and that the images used to prove each
offense were different. In doing so, the courts lost sight of the relevant
inquiry. That is, were the images offered to prove "receipt" and "posses-
sion" received through the same transaction (i.e., through the same act)?
If the images offered to prove "possession" were received coincident to
the images offered to prove "receipt," the convictions rest upon the same
act in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. But, in Bobb and
Polouizzi, the government never proved when the defendant received the
images offered to prove "possession." Therefore, the Third Principle is
irrelevant if the government does not prove separate acts of "receipt"
because the time of "receipt" and "possession" will always differ-with
"receipt" always occurring before "possession."
However, in almost all child pornography cases, the government
will be able to prove separate acts of "receipt." Typical child pornogra-
phy defendants download and receive multiple images through separate
"transactions," regardless of how "transactions" are defined. These cases
require a slightly different double jeopardy analysis. Imagine a defen-
dant who downloads ten images on January 1st, ten images on February
1st and ten images on March 1st. The government searches the defen-
dant's house on April 1st and finds all thirty images stored on his com-
puter. Under the First Principle, the defendant can only be convicted on
one count of "possession" which occurred on April Ist. Under the Sec-
ond Principle, the defendant can also be convicted on three counts of
"receipt" which occurred on January 1st, February 1st and March 1st.
These convictions would not violate the Third Principle because the date
of "possession" is different from the dates of "receipt." Yet these con-
victions would violate the Fourth Principle because the images offered
to prove each count of "receipt" were used to prove the single count of
''possession."
There are two ways the government can avoid violating the Fourth
Principle in this scenario and still convict the defendant of "receipt" and
167. See discussion infra Part L.B.
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"possession." First, it could charge the defendant with only two counts
of "receipt" occurring on January 1st and February 1st. Then, it could
offer the ten images received on March Ist to prove "possession" with-
out violating the Fourth Principle. The government could also use the
approach taken in the first hypothetical to obtain convictions on all three
"receipt" counts and still convict the defendant on one "possession"
count. This could be achieved by simply breaking up the images
received on one of the dates into two sets. For example, the government
could break up the images received on March Ist into two sets of five
images. In the indictment, the government could charge the defendant
with "receiving" five images on March 1st and "possessing" the left
over five images on April Ist. This approach complies with the Fourth
Principle, but it demonstrates just how easy it is for the government to
arbitrarily avoid the double jeopardy protection afforded to the defend-
ants in Miller and Davenport.
The Second Principle is what really allows the government to cir-
cumvent the double jeopardy protection afforded in Miller and Daven-
port. Like the court in Bullock, the Second Circuit in Polouizzi refused
to merge multiple "receipt" counts into one. Instead, Polouizzi estab-
lished the Second Principle that separate "transactions" support separate
"receipt" counts. The Second Principle creates the same "merger" prob-
lem the court faced in Bullock in the firearm context. Just as with fire-
arms, it is problematic to allow multiple "receipt" convictions based on
separate "transactions" involving child pornography.
There are two main reasons why separate instances of "receiving"
child pornography should merge into a single count. First, the stockpil-
ing problem that concerned the court in Bullock is adequately addressed
by the child pornography Guidelines, which take into account the num-
ber of images involved.168 Like the firearm statute at issue in Bullock,
§ 2252 ambiguously punishes the "receipt" of "any" child pornography.
This ambiguity creates the same sentencing problem that resulted from
the Bullock decision. That is, someone who receives a thousand images
of child pornography at once can receive only one conviction whereas
someone who receives less total images, but at different times, can be
convicted on multiple counts. The child pornography Guidelines create
the necessary link between the severity of punishment and the culpabil-
ity of the defendant.16 9 Defendants who "receive" and "possess" more
images are subjected to more punishment under the Guidelines through
168. U.S. SENTENCING GurmLs MAIuAL § 2G2.2(b)(7) (2008) ("If the offense involved-
(A) at least 10 images, but fewer than 150, increase by 2 levels; (B) at least 150 images, but fewer
than 300, increase by 3 levels; (C) at least 300 images, but fewer than 600, increase by 4 levels;
and (D) 600 or more images, increase by 5 levels.").
169. Id.
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enhancements." 0 If "receipt" counts are not merged, Defendants will
inevitably be subjected to inconsistent prosecution and punishment.
Merging "receipt" counts also eliminates the need to decipher when
a separate "transaction" occurs under the Second Principle-a difficult
and potentially arbitrary task. This is especially true in the context of
downloading because efforts to differentiate between acts of "receipt"
are unsatisfying. The court was able to dodge this technical issue in
Polouizzi because the government alleged that the defendant
downloaded images on four different dates, but did not try to prove sep-
arate instances of "receipt" within those four days. Because "the evi-
dence did not show, and the jury was not asked to determine whether
[the defendant's] receipt of multiple images on any one of these dates
reflected a single simultaneous transfer or discrete and distinct trans-
fers," the court held that the evidence could only support four counts of
"receipt"-one for each day.17 1
But, eventually, courts will have to decide what evidence can sup-
port separate convictions for "receiving" child pornography. In the most
technical sense, it would seem as though each download constitutes a
separate "transaction" that could result in one "receipt" conviction. This
would result in multiple "receipt" convictions for typical child pornogra-
phy defendants, most of whom download numerous images at different
times. But if each download constitutes a single act of "receipt," the
Bullock problem still infects sentencing integrity. Under this construc-
tion, a defendant who "receives" ten images by clicking on and
downloading each individual image at different times would be subject
to ten "receipt" counts. At the same time, another defendant who clicks
on and downloads one file containing one thousand images would be
subject to only one count under the Second Principle.
The most consistent way for courts to resolve the double jeopardy
problem is to merge all instances of "receiving" child pornography into
a single count. That places all child pornography defendants in substan-
tially the same position and prevents the kind of disparate sentencing
that occurs when prosecutors are given the discretion to charge similarly
situated defendants in different ways. If all instances of "receipt"
merged into a single count, convicting defendants of "receipt" and "pos-
session" would become per se double jeopardy error regardless of how
many images were involved and regardless of how many different
instances of "transfer" occurred. That is because the images used to
prove "receipt" would have to be the same as the images used to prove
"possession," violating the Fourth Principle. Consistent with Ball, all
170. Id.
171. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d at 158.
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child pornography downloaders could be charged with one count of
"receipt" and one count of "possession." But if the defendant is con-
victed on both counts, the district court would be required to vacate one
of those convictions at its discretion to prevent double jeopardy error.
Then, regardless of which conviction is vacated, Guideline
§ 2G2.2(b)(7) would allow judges to enhance the defendant's sentence
in accordance with the number of images received or possessed. Conse-
quently, the judge's discretion to vacate "receipt" convictions would
ultimately restore sentencing authority with the Judiciary while simulta-
neously stripping it from the Executive.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decisions in Bobb and Polouizzi cast serious doubt on the
future of double jeopardy protection for defendants convicted of "receiv-
ing" and "possessing" child pornography. Those cases sanction an
approach to prosecution that will swallow up the double jeopardy pro-
tection necessary to prevent disparate sentencing and multiple convic-
tions that punish what is essentially the same offense. If each download
constitutes the offense of "receipt," the double jeopardy protection
afforded in Miller and Davenport becomes meaningless. Prosecutors can
always allege one instance of "receipt" that occurred at a definitive point
in time and use other images received at a different time to prove "pos-
session." This method of prosecution is consistent with the rationale in
Bullock. But, in the context of child pornography, it allows prosecutors
to manipulate the statutory scheme to obtain "receipt" convictions when
it is at best unclear whether Congress intended to impose five-year
mandatory sentences on every person who receives and, by definition,
possesses child pornography.
It appears as though there is no adequate judicial solution to this
problem. Even if courts were to require the merger of "receipt" counts,
the government could always just charge defendants with "receipt" and
not "possession." This would avoid the Blockburger problem altogether
and lock in five-year mandatory sentences for every child pornography
offender convicted. The judge would then have no discretion to vacate
the "receipt" conviction because there would be no double jeopardy
error to begin with. This is why, ultimately, Congress must fix the "puz-
zle" recognized by Judge Posner so that "receipt" and "possession" of
child pornography are punished equally.
Before fixing the "puzzle," however, Congress must determine
whether it wants personal-use receivers and possessors of child pornog-
raphy to serve mandatory five-year prison sentences. If Congress deter-
mines that all receivers and possessors deserve a minimum of five years
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in prison, then it should amend § 2252 by eliminating § 2252(b)(2) and
adding violations of § 2252(a)(4) within the scope of § 2252(b)(1). Cur-
rently, § 2252(b)(1) punishes anyone who "violates, or attempts or con-
spires to violate, paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of [§ 2252(a)]" for a period of
"not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years" imprisonment. 7 2 By
simply adding violations of paragraph (4) to § 2252(b)(1), Congress
could easily make the mandatory minimum and maximum punishments
for "receipt" and "possession" of child pornography equal.
If Congress determined that simple receivers and possessors of
child pornography deserve some lesser degree of mandatory punishment
or no mandatory punishment at all, it would be easiest to alter the Guide-
lines. Congress could alter the Guidelines by directing the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission to take "receipt" convictions outside the scope of
§ 2G2.2. The Commission could then create a new Guideline section
that specifically addresses convictions for simple "receipt" and "posses-
sion" of child pornography. The new Guideline section must punish sim-
ple "receipt" and "possession" equally. This is exactly what Chairman
Wilkens initially suggested when "possession" of child pornography was
first criminalized in 1990.'"
If Congress does not ensure that "receipt" and "possession" are
punished equally, prosecutors will continue to determine the sentencing
fate of a growing number of child pornography defendants. The govern-
ment's broad discretion to charge defendant's with "receipt," "posses-
sion" or both has a profound impact on child pornography sentencing,
which is already illogical and inconsistent.17 4 This discretion is particu-
larly troubling considering that the difference "between the receipt of
child pornography and the possession of child pornography is a distinc-
tion without a difference.""' The arbitrary differences in punishment for
"receipt" and "possession" ultimately furnishes the Executive with
unwarranted power to determine punishment-a quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial function. By fixing § 2252's paradox, Congress can lend
clarity and consistency to an extremely confused and consequential area
of the law and, at the same time, restore judges and prosecutors to their
proper roles.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (2008).
173. See 137 CONG. REc. H6736-02 (1991) (letter from Chairman Wilkens).
174. Interestingly enough, the Department of Justice under President Obama may now
recognize the need to resolve, or least look into, these inconsistencies. See Marcia Coyle, DOJ
Wants Sentences Examined, NAT'L L.J., July 19, 2010, at 21 (citing an annual report issued by the
Department of Justice that urged the U.S. Sentencing Commission to investigate disparate child
pornography sentences).
175. United States v. Szymanski, No. 08-CR-417, 2009 WL 1212252, at *4.
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